Abstract Multicast, originally designed as an efficient way of broadcasting content, is being used in security protocols. Multicast security protocols are difficult to verify using model checking because they typically involve a large number of participants. Likewise, the exponential growth of knowledge being distributed during protocol run is a challenge. From a specification point of view, multicast is also a general way of representing message casting in protocol verification, with unicast, anycast and broadcast as special cases. Using the inductive method of protocol verification and Isabelle/HOL, we have devised techniques for specifying multicast protocols and proving many of their essential properties. We show backwards compatibility revisiting a well-known protocol and secrecy proofs for a mixed environment protocol as a case study. Our contributions are twofold: a usable multicast specification using the inductive method and the assertion that protocols should be verified by default using a multicast specification.
Introduction
Multicast was initially advertised as a scheme for better network resource usage [25] and for maximising user experience when receiving content that could be replicated. Although multicast has become a reality, its application remains limited mostly by these initial assumptions. Multicast has been of some interest to the security community, initially with protocols for secure content delivery [7, 24] trying to address specific multicast problems and later in protocols that involve the Byzantine Agreement [18] , taking advantage of the messagecasting framework.
Multicast is versatile and can be seen as the basic building block of other message-casting frameworks. Once the complexity of specifying properties such as reliability is addressed for a multicast framework, its application for other message-casting frameworks is generally straightforward.
New security protocols are based on unicast, multicast, broadcast and a mixture of the modes. We can cite examples: protocols to assure secrecy on one-to-many communications [14] , to guarantee authenticity in one-to-many communications [12] , and for key distribution in one-to-many communications [15] . Some protocols deal with novel security goals such as the Byzantine agreement [16] , multiparty computation [6] and digital rights management [24] .
The verification process for such protocols must match the development done by designers. Some efforts were seen in the literature, but they generally struggle to cope: one-tomany message-casting models inherently increase the size and complexity of the knowledge sets of peers as well as the size that represents the execution. Efforts are being made using model checking with sequential calculus approaches [1, 13] and theorem proving, in particular using TAME, an interface for PVS from the Naval Research Laboratory in America [2] , and using Graham Steel's CORAL [26] .
Although TAME uses a theorem prover as a support tool, its strategy relies on proving automata states. Proving automata states differentiates our approach since we focus on the inductive specification of the protocol. An important work on the field of verification of multicast protocols is the one by Meadows et al. [19] , in which they verified one of the key distribution protocols proposed by the Multicast Workgroup using model checking.
Our work differentiates from the above specially as regards motivation and capacity. Our motivation is to have one single specification strategy to represent all messagecasting models, thus making the specification of protocols that use a plurality of message-casting methods a reality. Our advantage on capacity comes from the inductive nature of our specification, which allows potentially infinite sets of peers, knowledge and messages. Other techniques have either to be restricted or tailored to cope with this problem.
The verification of security protocols using theorem provers in higher-order logic is due to Paulson [23] . He introduced the inductive method, where protocols are formalised in typed higher-order logic as being an inductively defined set of all possible execution traces. An execution trace is a list of all possible events in a given protocol. Events include the sending or receiving of messages. There is a Dolev-Yao intruder, or Spy, who processes messages using two operators called analz and synth. Operator analz represents all the terms that the attacker can learn by cumulatively decrypting messages and synth represents all the messages he can compose with the knowledge he possesses. The method is mechanised using the generic theorem prover Isabelle/HOL [21] .
Protocols are defined as inductive sets constructed over abstract definitions of the network and cryptographic primitives. Theorems about protocol properties are formalised as statements about the set of all possible traces and are typically proven inductively. The computational model is an operational semantics, giving it great flexibility and admitting an unlimited number of concurrent executions. This approach has been used to prove a series of classical protocols [23] as well as some well-known industrial-grade ones, such as the SET online payment protocol, Kerberos and SSL/TLS [5] .
The implementation aspects of what Steel did with CORAL in the verification of multicast-based security protocols confirms the great potential of the inductive method. CORAL is a specialised tool based on the inductive method, but it relies on First-Order Logic. FOL is not typed and cannot quantify over predicates and sets that can hinder the verification when counting over channels is required.
Another recent effort regarding extensions to the inductive method which parallels with our work is the one by Butin et al. [8] . Butin et al. is mostly concerned about showing the impacts of blind signatures and the ability to prove theorems regarding privacy and unlikability in election protocols. Their aims were never directed to explore the true nature of the Multicast operations present in the protocol. Our work differentiates from this specific attempt specially in the sense of how the trace of events is expanded and the impact it has on counting over the channels. Although Butin's attempt enables the specification of cryptographic schemes that are dependent on the receiver knowledge as we did, it does not enable us to precisely count over the trace.
Our aim, then, is to extend the inductive method to enable reasoning about multicast-based events. Our main goal is to create a versatile event model that can encompass multicast and the other variations of message casting.
The contributions of this work are:
• The creation of a theory and a set of lemmas to enable reasoning regarding multicast protocols in the inductive method.
• The analysis regarding proof strategy of these changes using Needham-Schroeder shared key protocol [20] .
• The analysis regarding proof strategy for the verification of secrecy in an unreliable multicast setting using the Franklin-Reiter sealed-bid auction protocol [11] .
Our idea in this paper was to briefly review general multicast protocols (Sect. 2) and to motivate our augmentation of the inductive method with a multicast-capable event theory. Then, we will see our contributions in the extension of the inductive method towards having a fully capable multicast event theory (Sect. 3). We demonstrate backwards compatibility by verifying Needham-Schroeder shared key protocol under our new specification. We will also show an example of protocol verification in a mixed environment using the proposed message-casting framework together with the standard message types for the inductive method. We will conclude with an analysis of the new verification capabilities the inductive method has after these extensions and why verification methods should be built over multicast.
General multicast protocols
Multicast aims to use the network layer efficiently by requiring the source to issue the packet only once even if it needs to be delivered to a large agent population. The network is in charge of doing the necessary replication and enabling the delivery of the payload to all the agents within the multicast group.
Normally, due to implementation constraints, multicast is unreliable. The usual application of transmitting data streams for content delivery [17] makes efficiency the sole objective. Other applications require multicast to behave as a network layer where lossless transmission, non-duplication of content and ordering need to be enforced. Security protocols are generally among these applications. To address that, we see the inception of a classification for multicast, dividing them in three categories.
1. Unreliable multicast messages can be lost, permuted and delivered multiple times. Some security protocols can cope with these properties. 2. Reliable multicast all members of the multicast group will receive the same message. The loss of messages is prevented, thanks to the usage of transport layers that account for reliability. Reliable multicast schemes are the basis for the Byzantine Agreement [18] . 3. Atomic multicast schemes further enable members to have messages delivered in the order that they were sent, and each message only once. This category of multicast is very difficult to achieve and normally yields a security protocol in itself, since it requires the existence of some basic security properties, such as uniqueness and reliability.
Our specification of multicast events in the inductive method is aimed at unreliable and reliable multicast. Unreliable multicast can be achieved in a straightforward manner by only casting a message with the multicast primitive. Reliable multicast can be achieved by using a message reception primitive ("Gets") interacting over the multicast group as a precondition. This precondition is set in the next message requiring that all the recipients in the multicast group indeed received the previous message. Atomic multicast is out of scope in this work, since atomic multicast is usually yielded by a protocol in itself.
Inductive method extensions for multicast
The inductive method previously allowed only three formal events, which formalise the act of sending, receiving and noting a message. A Says event formalises the act of an agent sending a message to another agent. A Gets event, introduced by Bella [4] , formalises the act of receiving a message. And finally, a Notes event formalises the act of an agent locally storing information for future use.
We explored different choices to the specification of multicast events. In our first attempt, we tried specifying the multicast communication as a series of unicast communications from the sender to all recipients in the multicast group. This idea allowed us to use the existing data type and associated formal theory, but it proved difficult to use, and it did not properly distinguish between a multicast event and a series of unicast events. This approach did not appear to be able to model the different types of multicasts mentioned in Sect. 2 and did not allow us to work over the subtle side-channels inherent to multicast. Therefore, we decided to extend data type event, creating a primitive to represent a multicast communication. This created the possibility of expressing unicast, broadcast and other casting frameworks using the multicast primitive.
Definition 1 Multicast event data type definition
data type event = Says agent agent msg |Multicast agent"(agent list)""(agent= >msg)" |Gets agent msg |Notes agent msg
The new data type of events retains the primitives of the original event data type for the sake of compatibility. Our theory can replace the Events theory distributed with Isabelle/HOL. If multicast is not used, the verification remains unchanged for the protocols in Isabelle/HOL's library.
We add to the data type event a new primitive Multicast, where an agent sends a message to a multicast group. We represent the group by a list, which implies an ordering of the group members. The idea of representing the message as a function over agents comes from direct inspiration from the real multicast communication and the necessity of implementing anycast, as most security protocols require. In a real scenario, a peer sends the same message to a group of receivers, and each receiver is capable of interpreting the message in different ways, sometimes depending on the knowledge he already has.
Another reason for letting each peer apply a function with his own parameters is that this creates his own view of the message. This is necessary for protocols where the message delivered to an agent is encrypted using that agent's key: the messages received by the agents in the multicast group are identical, but carry different interpretations. This will become clear below (3.1 and 3.2), where we extend the knowledge of peers based on their point of view inside or outside of the multicast group.
Although it seems contradictory to reject a formalisation based on unicast to represent multicast and implement a multicast data type capable of representing unicast and broadcast, this formalisation does not suffer the setbacks of the previous ideas. We also wanted to create a generic formalisation to corroborate our motivational idea that unicast and broadcast are extremes for multicast, setting multicast as the base primitive for verifying security protocols.
As important features of our multicast specification:
• It is able to represent casting to a set of arbitrary size and the encryption can be done as a function of the recipients.
• It could be used for verifying group key exchange protocols, such as the ones verified in Chiridi et al. [9] and Paiola and Blanchet [22] .
• It is also able to overcome some of the stated limitations on the verification of the Helios protocol done by Smith and Cortier [10] .
In the next sections, we will show the extensions made in how peers acquire knowledge (Sect. 3.1) and how to access all derivations coming from the application of the function to each peer's point of view through the function used (Sect. 3.2).
Extending Peers' knowledge set for multicast communications
Peer knowledge, formalised by the set knows, enables us to reason about key distribution as well as confidentiality. The original work by Paulson [23] did not take into account the knowledge each peer acquired. Its main concern was what the Spy was able to learn. The knows function represents how the knowledge of each peer-the Spy included-is expanded during the execution of the protocol, in accordance with Bella's goal availability principle [4] . Definition 2 shows our new specification for the knows function. The function knows is now specified in four cases in two steps. In the base case, knows_Nil, the trace of events is empty and the knowledge is equal to its initial knowledge prior to the execution of the protocol. When we move to the case of a non-empty trace, we have two classes of peers (compromised and non-compromised) and four cases each.
The Spy is able to learn differently than other peers. When he sees an event Says sending X as a message, we extend his knowledge by inserting X to his knowledge set. When he sees an event Multicast from a peer to a multicast group casting XF we add to the knowledge of the Spy the image of the function XF over the set of peers in the multicast group. When he sees a Gets event he learns nothing, because he already learnt it at the sending event. When a peer learns a message X through the predicate Notes, the Spy will learn the message X if the peer is compromised.
When a peer sends a message X via a Says event, we extend his knowledge by inserting X. When the peer issues an event Multicast to a multicast group casting XF, we add to his knowledge the image of the function XF over the set of peers in the multicast group. When he Gets a message X through the predicate Gets, we insert X to his knows set. When he learns a message X through the predicate Notes, we insert X to his knows set.
It is important to state that each peer starts with his own set of knowledge to which the knows function will add. This initial state is denoted by the function initState. The idea of the function initState is to receive an agent and return a message set that corresponds to his initial knowledge prior to the run of the protocols. The availability of prior knowledge will define how the knowledge set will be processed, especially in this multicast setting.
During the specification of the event data type and the extension of the function knows, we noticed some subtleties regarding the multicast constructor and its reception, especially regarding knowledge gathering. Our initial design included an event GetsMC to deal with the reception of multicast messages. This seemed attractive since a multicast message conveys information regarding the knowledge other peers in the multicast group may have acquired. We concluded that side-channel information leaking is inherent to multicast. When we receive a multicast message addressed to us and two others, we do not just learn the contents of the message, but also that the other two users may also have received their view of the message contents. This idea can be extended even further, since the other two peers know that we may know the information.
This refinement of the function knows would add new possibilities of inferring other peers' knowledge. The extension of the function knows to deal with other peer's knowledge is very attractive to use with novel threat models. Examples of such new threat models are the Rational Attacker [3] where different attackers collude on the basis of cost/benefit decisions whether to follow or not to follow the protocol and the General Attacker [3] , which drops the cost/benefit decision from the Rational Attacker. The General Attacker's differentiation from a Dolev-Yao is that each peer acts for his own sake. Finally, there is the Multi-Attacker [3] , where each principal behaves as a Dolev-Yao attacker, but they will never reveal their long-term secrets to other peers.
We can, for example, conjecture that this new peer knowledge acquisition model can enable us to reason about the detection or not of retaliation attacks [3] in certain multicast scenarios.
We dropped the idea of knowledge reflection to show sidechannels leakage: gathering this information is difficult in practice because multicast is supposed to hide group composition. This is even more problematic in an environment where message reception cannot be guaranteed. Another issue was that we did not want to break backward compatibility by changing the shape of the function knows and reimplementing all the other affected definitions to accommodate this change. Ultimately, making changes to accommodate these properties from multicast communication would require a complete rethinking of the Dolev-Yao threat model. We formalise receiving a multicast message via the usual Gets primitive.
With the new definition of the function knows, we now can reason about knowledge acquired by peers during the execution of multicast-based protocols, as well as design the necessary lemmas to make the specification usable.
Extending the used set for multicast
The function used enables us to reason about freshness. Freshness is essential for reasoning about the unicity of certain messages. It is also a key compositional property for reasoning about key distribution. The used function forms the set of all message components that have already appeared in the event trace plus all the information all peers initiated the protocol run with. Definition 3 shows the extended version of the function used, now encompassing the multicast primitive.
Definition 3
The used parts of messages, with Multicast The used function is specified recursively. The base case, used_Nil, is when our event trace is empty. It is defined by the union of the application of the function parts to the initial state of all peers.
The recursive case concerns the components used during trace construction. There are four cases, one for each event constructor. The first case concerns the primitive Says, where the application of the function parts on the message X is joined with the used set of the remaining events. The second case concerns Multicast: we apply the function parts to the image of function XF over the set of peer in the multicast group B and join the result with the set of remaining events. The third case concerns the Gets primitive, where no action is taken since the parts are already considered used when sent. Finally, the fourth case concerns the primitive Notes, which is similar to Says.
This extension of the used function is key for adding multicast support to the inductive method. It has been kept stable from the first versions of the inductive method [23] , since the additions made for encompassing message reception were only technical and did not change the set construction. Adding the multicast primitive makes the set potentially bigger and more complex to reason about. This extension may prove difficult to implement in other methods that are constrained by the size of the information sets they can handle. Our decision to build our specification over the inductive method and Isabelle/HOL was wise even taking into account the inherent difficulty of mastering it.
Verification of a classic unicast protocol
One of the main challenges of implementing multicast support to the inductive method was making it capable of covering the extreme cases. Following the idea that unicast and broadcast are the extremes of a multicast communication, in this section, we show how a unicast protocol can have its properties verified using our multicast implementation in unicast mode of operation. Unicast is achieved by sending a multicast to a multicast group of size one. We chose to do this demonstration using a classical protocol; NeedhamSchroeder shared key [20] .
The choice of Needham-Schroeder shared key protocol is justified by the fact it has well-known security goals, and its verification was already very well covered elsewhere [23] . Its authentication and key distribution goals made it well suited for our demonstration aims. Its proofs achieving key distribution and authentication of both peers with the assistance of a trusted third party produce enough details to measure the effort needed to use multicast as the main event model in the inductive method.
In the next subsections, we will cover the modifications in the Needham-Schroeder shared key protocol to make it verifiable under the multicast environment and the choices made in this re-implementation (Sect. 4.1). Following the description of the changes (Sect. 4.2), we will cover the verification process (Sect. 4.3), focusing on the challenges introduced in the proof methods and how this impacts the outcomes and effort for the protocol verification process.
Our focus in this work is solely testing the impact of adding a multicast primitive to the inductive method from the proof strategy point of view. At the time of experimenting and writing this piece, we were not interested in finding and demon-strating the inner security outcomes of verifying a protocol under a series of unicast events versus using our multicast theory. We leave this as future work.
Revisiting Needham-Schroeder shared key
We revisit the Needham-Schroeder shared key protocol to verify it under the multicast model. By doing this, we will be creating a new protocol variant called Needham-Schroeder shared key multicast mode. This is achieved by substituting all the unicast primitives by unreliable multicast ones, thus enabling the protocol to use our multicast implementation in the process.
Our main goal was to show that a multicast implementation can be used for unicast, giving the basis to suggest it as the default implementation for the inductive method. Our objective is to measure the new complexity introduced in the proof construction process.
The classical unicast protocol is then transformed to a multicast variant as shown in Fig. 1 .
Obvious choices in the translation were made, such as the usage of an unreliable multicast, since the previous protocol verification scenario had the same constraint of unreliability of unicast. Note that we do not use functions to address the keys being used to encrypt traffic, as it would be expected in a true multiple receiver multicast protocol. This is because there will be only one encryption. The choice was done for the sake of fidelity with the real implementation of the protocol. The usage of these functions would only impact the proof strategy. The main change would be to use more aggressive destruction rules for function congruence. Function congruence rules are necessary to enable the Isabelle/HOL's reasoner to define equalities over the λ functions introduced by our definition of multicast.
Needham-Schroeder shared key multicast modelling
The verification of the Needham-Schroeder shared key multicast consists first of the creation of a specification in Isabelle/HOL that represents the protocol defined in the Fig. 1 . To start, a constant ns_shared_MC is declared as an inductive set of lists of events, which represents the formal protocol model. This inductive set set-up is shown in Definition 4. We define the empty trace by the rule Nil, which sets the base of the induction.
The Spy's illegal activity is formalised by the rule FakeMC, which includes any forging the Spy is able to perform from the knowledge acquired from the trace of events so far. Rule FakeMC is a variant from the rule Fake from the unicast verification process. It gives the Spy the power to multicast any message with components he learned from traffic analysis, to any multicast group, even to subgroups or to groups never mentioned in the protocol. The Isabelle/HOL implementation of the rules Nil and FakeMC are shown in Definition 5.
Definition 5 Inductive Definition of Needham-Schroeder
Shared Key Distribution Protocol using Multicast Primitive -Empty set and Fake Rules
The protocol then starts with a phase composed by two messages where the agent A will request the trusted third party Server to initialise a communication with the agent B. During this phase, the Server will generate a session key to be used by agents A and B and will give to A the means to proceed to the next phase.
To address this phase, our model is extended initially by the rule NS1. The only precondition of the rule NS1 is that the session identifier NA was never used in the set of traces of events, avoiding then the collision with a pre-existent session. If this precondition is met, we extend the trace of events by adding a Multicast message from the agent A to the multicast group composed of the agent Server. The message carries agent's A identity, agent's B identity and the session identifier NA.
The next extension of the model is done by rule NS2. The preconditions of this rule state that if the trace of events contains a message with the syntax of the message added by the rule NS1, from any agent and addressed to the Server and the session key KAB is indeed a session key and was never used before in the set of traces of events, we can extend the actual trace. We then add to the trace of events a Multicast from the Server to the multicast group composed solely of agent A, containing the identity of agent A, the identity of agent B, the session identifier NA and a certificate for A to forward to B. This certificate is composed by the session key K AB and the identity of A, encrypted with the long-term shared key of the agent B. The whole message multicasted by the Server to agent A is encrypted under the long-term shared key of agent A.
The Isabelle/HOL implementation of rule NS1 and rule NS2 can be seen on Definition 6.
Definition 6
Inductive Definition of Needham-Schroeder Shared Key Distribution Protocol using Multicast Primitive -Rule NS1 and Rule NS2
After agent A received from the Server the certificate and the session key necessary to proceed the communication establishment, she forwards the certificate to agent B. Upon receiving the certificate, agent B recognises it because it was encrypted with the key he shares with the Server.
To test agent's A aliveness and possession of the session key, agent B sends agent A a message containing a freshness value encrypted with the session key. Upon receiving B's message, agent A decrypts it with the session key. To prove the possession of the key and his aliveness, agent A sends agent B a message with the freshness value modified in an expected way and encrypted under the session key.
To cover the above steps, our model is extended by the rule NS3. This rule has as preconditions that the trace of events contains a Multicast event sent by some agent S to agent A with the syntax of rule NS2, and that the trace of events contains a Multicast event from agent A to the Server with the syntax of rule NS1. If these preconditions are met, we can extend the trace with the Multicast event from agent A to the multicast group represented solely by agent B sending the certificate agent A received from agent S. Deliberately, we use agent S instead of agent Server, because we cannot know the message indeed came from agent Server.
Our next extension to the model is rule NS4. The preconditions of rule NS4 are that the freshness value NB was never used in the set of traces before, and the key K received inside the certificate is indeed a session key. We also have a precondition that the trace of events contains a Multicast from some agent A to some multicast group containing B with a session key K and the identity of agent A encrypted under the shared key between agent B and the Server. If the preconditions are met, we can extend the trace of events with a Multicast event from agent B to the group solely represented by agent A containing the freshness value NB encrypted with the session key K.
The model is then extended to the last message of the protocol by rule NS5. The preconditions of rule NS5 are that key K is a session key and the trace of events contain a Multicast from an agent B' to A with the syntax of rule NS4 and a Multicast message from an agent S to a multicast group containing agent A with the syntax of rule NS2. If the preconditions are met, we can extend the trace of events by adding a Multicast event from agent A to the multicast group represented by agent B of the agreed modification of the freshness value NB encrypted by the session key K.
The Isabelle/HOL implementation of rule NS3, rule NS4 and rule NS5 can be seen on Definition 7.
Definition 7 Inductive Definition of Needham-Schroeder Shared Key Distribution Protocol using Multicast Primitive -Rule NS3, NS4 and NS5
Finally, we add to our definition the possibility of having session keys being compromised by the Spy. Although this is not part of the standard protocol, it is added to our model to be able to show that the loss of control in one session does not represent problems to other concurrent sessions. The preconditions of rule Oops are that a Multicast from an agent B to a multicast group A is on the trace with the syntax of the rule NS4 and a Multicast from the Server to the same multicast group A with the syntax of rule NS2 are on the set of traces of events. If the preconditions are met, we add to the knowledge of the Spy through a Notes event, the knowledge of the freshness value NA, the freshness value NB and the session key K.
The Isabelle/HOL implementation of rule Oops can be seen on Definition 8. We should make clear that the protocol steps are represented by rules NS1, NS2, NS3, NS4 and NS5.
In the next subsection, we will be looking over the verification process of the protocol modelled here, and at the end of this section, we will be analysing the outcomes of our re-implementation.
Needham-Schroeder shared key multicast verification
In this subsection, we will present the main guarantees proven for the Needham-Schroeder shared key multicast protocol. Our main goal was not to find new attacks on the modified version of the protocol but to measure the effort needed to rebuild the tactics for proving the new variant correct.
The term evs will always stand for a generic trace of the formal protocol model specified in the previous section. We will be presenting the proof in a forward style, covering initially subgoals of Regularity and Reliability, followed by Authenticity, Unicity, Confidentiality and Authentication. Finally, we will show some of the newly introduced lemmas that enabled us to reason about the previous properties using the multicast variant of the events model.
Regularity
An important regularity property present in the protocol is that the long-term keys shared between the Server and the general population of agents cannot appear on the traffic. If this key appears, the protocol is not being followed and the player whose key appeared is corrupted by the Spy. This is expressed by Lemma 1 (Spy_Analz_ShrK).
Lemma 1 Spy_Analz_ShrK
evs ∈ ns_shared_MC ⇒ (Key (shrK A ) ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)) = ( A ∈ bad) Lemma 1 (Spy_Analz_ShrK) is easily provable. We will appeal to Lemma 2 to enable us to reason about the encrypted part of the rule NS3 and to Lemma 3 to reason about the accidental loss of session keys. An important difference in terms of proof strategy in this lemma is that we need to explicitly appeal to Lemma 3 (Oops_parts_spies) . This was needed to help the classical reasoner to solve Lemma 1 (Spy_Analz_ShrK).
Lemma 2 NS3_msg_in_parts_spies
Multicast S [A] (λC. Crypt(shrK A){|N, B, K, X| }) ∈ set evs ⇒ X ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)
Lemma 3 Oops_parts_spies
Multicast Server [A] (λC. Crypt(shrK A){|NA, B, K, X| }) ∈ set evs ⇒ K ∈ parts (knows Spy evs)
In all three cases of Regularity, proof effort was very similar to doing the proof using the unicast implementation and is easily sorted out by using the automation embedded in Isabelle/HOL, especially the proof assistant Sledgehammer.
Reliability
As usual in key distribution protocols based on shared key cryptography, a relevant Lemma regards the reliability of the Server since this property is for the distribution of session keys. It is expressed by the Lemma 4 (Says_Server_Message_Form).
Lemma 4 Says_Server_Message_Form
The proof of Lemma 4 (Says_Server_Message_Form) is very close to its unicast counterpart. We first prepare and apply induction then we call the simplifier and the classical reasoner. The main difference in the multicast version of the proof is that we need to give the classical reasoner knowledge of function congruence and apply it aggressively to converge to the proof.
Another important reliability lemma regards the evidence that the certificate agent A receives from the Server, which she will forward to agent B. Lemma 5 (cert_A_Form) shows us this property.
Lemma 5 cert_A_Form
[[Crypt (shrK A) {|NA, Agent B, Key K, X| } ∈ parts (knows Spy evs); A / ∈ bad; evs ∈ ns_shared_MC]] ⇒ K / ∈ range shrK ∧ X = Crypt (shrK B) {|Key K, Agent A| } Lemma 5 (cert_A_Form) is proven in the very same form its unicast counterpart is. We give to the classical reasoner Lemma 4 (Says_Server_Message_Form) and Lemma 6 (A_trusts_NS2).
As with Regularity Lemmas, proving Reliability Lemmas using the multicast events theory is straighforward. The usual main modification is the usage of function congruence needed to reason about equalities in terms of the function present in each multicast event.
Authenticity
Proving authenticity goals also means to prove a message is trusted by the receiving peer. So, for every sent message, there should be a Lemma that stated its authenticity. This is true in the Needham-Schroeder shared key multicast protocol, with the exception of NS1. This happens due to the fact NS1 does not use any sort of encryption, and thus no authentication mechanism.
Lemma 6 (A_trusts_NS2) shows us that if a message with the syntax of NS2 was sent in the trace, it must have originated with the Agent Server. The proof is similar to its unicast counterpart. We start both by preparing and applying induction, followed by the appeal to Lemma 2 (NS3_msg_in_parts_spies) to enable us to reason about the encrypted part of NS3. Lemma 6 (A_trusts_NS2) now requires us to give the classical reasoner knowledge of function congruence and apply it aggressively to reason about the multicast messages' function equalities. We are then left with rule FakeMC, which requires the appeal to Lemma 1 (Spy_Analz_ShrK).
Lemma 6 A_trusts_NS2
Lemma 7 (B_trusts_NS3) produces similar guaranties as Lemma 6 (A_trusts_NS2). In this case, we assert that if a message component with the syntax of the certificate forwarded in rule NS3 is in the trace, then certificate is originated with the Server. The proof is similar to proving Lemma 6 (A_trusts_NS2). We start both by preparing and applying induction, followed by the appeal to Lemma 2 (NS3_msg_in_parts_spies). We then apply the simplifier followed by the classical reasoner, and we are then left with rule FakeMC, which requires the appeal to Lemma 1 (Spy_Analz_ShrK).
Lemma 7 B_trusts_NS3
Lemma 8 (A_trusts_NS4) regards the authenticity of NS4 to the receiving peer A. It states that if a message component with the syntax of rule NS4 is in the trace and a message component with the syntax of rule NS2 is in the trace, the confidential information was not leaked by rule Oops and both the sender and the receiver of the message four are not colluding with the Spy, then NS4 indeed was generated by agent B.
Lemma 8 A_trusts_NS4
[ The proof is closely related to its unicast counterpart. The proof appeals to Lemma 6 (A_trusts_NS2) and to the fact the Spy cannot see the content of encrypted messages (Spy_not_see_encrypted_key). 1 We start both by preparing and applying induction, followed by the appeal to Lemma 2. We then apply the simplifier followed by the classical reasoner. The remaining cases are sorted out by the usage of the analz_mono_contra tactic and the simplifier and classical reasoner appealing aggressively to the function congruence lemma. We are then left with the subgoals yielded by rule NS4, which can be proven by appealing to Lemma 10 (unique_session_keys), Lemma 7 and Lemma (Multicast_implies_in_parts_spies).
Comparing the proof of Lemma 8 (A_trusts_NS4) with its unicast counterpart, we can see some complication arising due to the function used in the multicast implementation. But all the cases that were not straightforward could easily be solved with the help of the proof assistant Sledgehammer.
Finally, Lemma 9 (B_trusts_NS5) regards the authentication of agent A as the sender of NS5. If the message yielded by rule NS5 appears on the trace, the message yielded by rule NS3 appears on the trace, no keys were leaked to the Spy through the rule Oops, and both sender and receiver are not colluding with the Spy, then the message yielded by rule NS5 in fact originated with the agent B.
Lemma 9 B_trusts_NS5
[[Crypt K {|Nonce NB, Nonce NB| } ∈ parts (knows Spy evs); Crypt (shrK B) {|Key K, Agent A| } ∈ parts (knows Spy evs); ∀ NA NB. Notes Spy {|NA, NB, Key K| } / ∈ set evs; A / ∈ bad;B / ∈ bad; evs ∈ ns_shared_MC]] ⇒ Multicast A [B] (λC. Crypt K {|Nonce NB, Nonce NB| }) ∈ set evs
The proof appeals to Lemma 7 (B_trusts_NS3) and the fact that the Spy cannot see the session keys encrypted under long-term keys (Spy_not_see_encrypted_key).
The proof relies on an intermediate lemma, which is proven by preparing and applying induction, followed by the appeal to Lemma 2 (NS3_msg_in_parts_spies) as usual. The proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 8 (A_trusts_NS4), leaving us with the subgoal yielded by the rule NS5.
The subgoal yielded by rule NS5 proved to be difficult to solve in comparison to its unicast version. We start appealing to Lemma (Multicast_implies_in_parts_spies) and then to the classical reasoner applying aggressive function congruence. This will yield two new subgoals that are solved similarly. We divide each subgoal by the case of the sender agent being colluding with the Spy and then prove the first case appealing to the fact that if the Spy is not able to see session keys encrypted under long-term shared keys, then the agent to whom the long-term shared key belongs is colluding with the Spy (Crypt_Spy_analz_bad). 2 The second case is solved as the unicast counterpart by appealing to Lemma 6 (A_trusts_NS2) and Lemma 10 (unique_session_keys).
Verifying authenticity properties using the multicast event implementation added some complications to proofs. In general, these complications arise due to the way multicast is implemented using functions, and also because in some cases the classical reasoner was not able to perform without the correct guidance.
Unicity
Unicity properties concern the creation and use of fresh values and their correct use by the agents executing the protocol. They bind a fresh value to the message that originated it and to other components present in this message.
In Needham-Schroeder shared key multicast protocol, we have a lemma for the unicity of sessions keys distributed by the Server. Lemma 10 (unique_session_keys) states that if a session key K is multicasted by the Server, it is unique and bound to the other values of the message. Clearly, a key K cannot be bound to two different sessions or freshness values NA. The proof is very similar to its unicast counterpart. We start by preparing and applying induction, followed by a call to the simplifier and the classical reasoner, applying function congruence. The main difference in the proofs is that to prove the subgoal yielded by the rule NS2, we need to explicitly appeal to Lemma 2 (NS3_msg_in_parts_spies).
Lemma 10 unique_session_keys
Proving unicity under the multicast event model is straightforward and easily achievable, requiring minor guidance to the classical reasoner, which was implicit in the unicast variant.
Confidentiality
Confidentiality of certain components is necessary for the protocol to achieve its goals. The Needham-Schroeder shared key multicast protocol has an important confidentiality lemma regarding the secrecy of the sessions keys distributed.
Lemma 11 (secrecy_lemma) states that if the trace of events is extended by the message yielded by rule NS2, and both the peers sharing the session key are not colluding with the Spy, then the non-existence of a leak of information by the rule Oops implies that the Spy does not know the session key K. To prove the secrecy argument for the session keys (Lemma 11 (secrecy_lemma)), we do the usual induction preparation and induction application followed by the appeal to Reliability arguments, such as Lemma 4 (Says_Server_Message_Form). For the other subgoals, except the yielded by rule NS3, we appeal to Lemma 2 (NS3_msg_in_ parts_spies) and Lemma 10 (unique_session_keys).
Lemma 11 secrecy_lemma
The proof for the subgoal yielded by rule NS3 requires Lemma 6 (A_trusts_NS2) and the fact that the Spy is able to see session keys encrypted under shared keys, and that the agent to whom the shared key belongs is colluding with the Spy. This is followed by the appeal to Lemma 10 (unique_session_keys) and also to Lemma (Multicast_implies_in_parts_spies). Lemma (Multicast_implies_-knows_Spy) helps us to express that if a message XF was Multicasted to a multicast group B, then the image of the function XF over the set B is a subset of the set of knowledge of the Spy in this trace. Its proof is trivial and not shown here.
The proof of confidentiality properties using the multicast event model is considerably more difficult that its unicast counterpart. This happens because the classical reasoner is unable to sort out small issues using its internal rules. But, nevertheless, the use of the multicast event model requires clear understanding of some steps. One good example hidden by Isabelle/HOL's automation in the unicast version is the necessity of appealing to Lemma 3 (Oops_parts_spies) to prove the subgoal yielded by rule NS2. Although one would argue that more complexity is bad, it is not always the case. As the general case in the inductive method, complexity forces the user to understand deeper the properties building up the protocol.
Authentication and key distribution
The ultimate goal of the Needham-Schroeder shared key multicast protocol is to allow key distribution and authentication to the agents involved in protocol execution, even in the presence of a powerful Spy. To be able to establish mutual weak agreement with the protocol, we need to trace back the originator of the authenticator.
Authentication in the inductive method can be interpreted as determining the true originator of the exchanged authentication token. One important definition for us to assert the true creator of a message component X is the predicate Issues [4] , which returns true if an agent A issues another agent B with X and X never appeared on the trace prior to that event.
To be able to do so, we need to add a predicate called Issues as in the original unicast version. Here, we use a multicast variant of Issues. As shown in Definition 9, we can assert the A Issues B with X if X is part of a message multicasted from A to multicast group B and X never appeared in the trace before this event. The implementation details of Issues requires the creation of a series of technical lemmas to deal with the transposition of the trace with the operation takeWhile. These lemmas are not discussed here.
Definition 9 The predicate Issues
The authentication and key distribution from agent A to agent B is stated by . If the freshness value NB encrypted by the session key K appears on the trace, the contents of NS2 encrypted under the long-term shared key between agent A and Server also appears on the trace, the key K is not available to the Spy, and A and B are not colluding with the Spy, then B is the true originator of NB encrypted by the session key K on the trace. Treating the predicate Issues requires giving to the simplifier the lemmas regarding transposition of the trace and giving the classical reasoner the function congruence lemma. We are left with the subgoals yielded by the rule NS3 and rule NS4. The subgoal yielded by rule NS3 is solved by appealing to Lemma (Multicast_implies_in_parts_spies) and to Lemma 5 (cert_A_Form). The other subgoal needs a special application of the transposition lemmas not covered here.
Lemma 12 A_authenticates_and_keydist_to_B
Mutual weak agreement demands proving the same guarantees we proved for A in Lemma 12 (A_authenticates_-and_keydist_to_B) now to B. This is shown in Lemma 13 (B_authenticates_and_keydist_to_A). It states that if the content of NS5 appears on the trace, the certificate issued by the Server to B is on the trace, the key K is not available to the Spy, and agents A and B are not colluding with the Spy, then A is the true originator of the NS5 on the trace.
Lemma 13 B_authenticates_and_keydist_to_A
[[Crypt K {|Nonce NB, Nonce NB| } ∈ parts (knows Spy evs); Crypt (shrK B) {|Key K, Agent A| } ∈ parts (knows Spy evs); Key K / ∈ analz (knows Spy evs); A / ∈ bad; B / ∈ bad; evs ∈ ns_shared_MC]] ⇒ A Issues B with Crypt K {|Nonce NB, Nonce NB| } on evs
To prove Lemma 13 (B_authenticates_and_keydist_to_A) we have to appeal to Lemma 9 (B_trusts_NS5) and Lemma 7 (B_trusts_NS3) . Similarly to the previous case with Lemma 12 (A_authenticates_and_keydist_to_B), we need to guarantee the authenticity of what agent B sees on the trace to prove the key distribution goal.
The predicate issues requires us also to give to the simplifier the lemmas regarding transposition of the trace and giving the classical reasoner the function congruence lemma. To sort out the remaining subgoals, we have to appeal to Lemma (Multicast_implies_in_parts_spies) and to Lemma 5 (cert_A_Form). We are then left with the subgoal yielded by the rule NS5. This subgoal appeals to a special version of the trace's transposition lemma and a lemma not covered here called A_trusts_NS5, which is similar to Lemma 9 (B_-trusts_NS5) but with agent's A guarantees.
The proofs regarding Lemma 12 (A_authenticates_-and_keydist_to_B) and Lemma 13 (B_authenticates_and_-keydist_to_A) are very similar to their unicast counterparts and did not demand the construction of any new proof strategy, except the usage of the function congruence rule.
Considerations of Needham-Schroeder shared key multicast verification
The verification of the Needham-Schroeder shared key multicast protocol succeeded in proving the same goals as the classical Needham-Schroeder shared key protocol, corroborating the claim that the new construction of the multicast event model is sufficient for the verification of unicast protocols. The objective of this revisit to an already verified protocol is twofold. First was the above stated claim of coverage of our new specification, and secondly, there was the intent of measuring the effort introduced in the adoption of a general multicast model for representing unicast communications in the verification process of security protocols. The idea was to corroborate the claims that unicast and broadcast are extremes for multicast at the communication level and to show that our implementation was capable of representing such detail.
Taking into consideration the verification process shown above, we can see that for the verification of regularity, reliability, unicity and authentication/key distribution goals in general terms did not add any new proof strategy effort, except the fact of adding the required function congruence lemma needed for sorting out the equalities yielded by the function on the multicast events.
Authentication goals generally required a better understanding of the proof strategy and a fierce guidance of the theorem prover to achieve the proofs. This happens due to the way multicast events are implemented using functions to derive the view of each recipient of the multicast group.
As usual, confidentiality goals involve complex proof strategies and complications with the theorem prover. This is evident when using the multicast event model in comparison to the standard unicast one. But we also can extract some new insights that come with these complications, since it requires better understanding of the protocol properties.
Understanding these complications is required to guide the theorem prover through. In a worst case scenario, it helps the understanding of the proof by not concealing the reasoning behind the automatic techniques of Isabelle/HOL.
Finally, we can say that the increase in the effort for constructing the proof under a multicast event model in comparison to a unicast one is moderate, which justifies an implementation in a mixed environment using the multicast primitives.
The Franklin-Reiter sealed-bid auction protocol
Franklin and Reiter [11] proposed in 1996 a protocol to enable the construction of a distributed trusted service capable of executing sealed-bid auctions by using threshold cryptography primitives and extended multicast properties. Their objective was to provide a sealed-bid auction service that is guaranteed to declare a winner, and also to collect payment from only that bidder, while guaranteeing that no bid was revealed before the agreed bid opening time. Moreover, it guaranteed that the system should be resilient to malfeasance of any auction house insider.
This protocol relies on secret sharing. A secret is divided into shares, which are distributed to a set of trustees. The secret is not intended to be known by any of the trustees. Let n be the number of trustees and let t be the threshold, the minimum number of shares required for the secret to be recovered. We call this n, t-sharing of the secret. Given at least t shares, the secret can be reconstructed. Collusion by fewer than t trustees does not yield any information.
The protocol also requires verifiable signature sharing [11] , or simply V S. This enables the holder of a digitally signed message to share the signature among a group of peers so that they can reconstruct the signature later, as with verifiable secret sharing. At the end of the sharing phase, the members can verify that they possess a valid share and that the signature can be reconstructed even if the original signer or some trustees are faulty. Faulty trustees gain no information regarding the original signature.
Protocol description
The protocol proposed by Franklin and Reiter is constructed using n auction servers, of which t are assumed to operate faithfully. In its conception, the protocol is claimed to be Byzantine-failure secure.
A bidder submits a bid with the amount he wants to pay for the item by sharing a digital coin (v $ , {|v $ |} Kr Bank , w $ ) with this value among all servers hosting the auction. The terms v $ and w $ are respectively the face value of the coin and the concealed identity of the coin holder which can be revealed in the case of a double spending. The true value of w $ can only be revealed by the bank. To prevent the auction servers from cheating, the coin values are split in different ways. The values of v $ and w $ are split using a standard secret sharing mechanism using our fault tolerance value of t as threshold. The signature of the face value for the coin {|v $ |} Kr Bank is shared using a V S signature sharing algorithm also using t as the threshold.
Once the bidding phase finishes, the servers in agreement will reconstruct the values for v $ and w $ for all bids cast during the bidding phase and will independently determine the winner. For the winning bid, the auction servers will perform a V S verification to see if the bid is valid and the money can be collected by reconstructing {|v $ |} Kr Bank . After this verification, the auction servers can award a token to the winning bidder to collect the item.
We found Franklin and Reiter's protocol description [11] unclear. The specification seemed to assume a lot of implicit calculations, in violation of protocol design principles, which could introduce some vulnerabilities. We summarise the Franklin-Reiter sealed-bid auction protocol in Fig. 2 .
The bidder B, holding a digital coin (v $ , {|v $ |} Kr Bank , w $ ), will issue an atomic multicast to the multicast group SG comprised of all participating auction servers. This multicast message starts with the auction identification token aid, followed by the n, t-sharing of the concatenation of the bidder's identity, the face value of the coin, and the freshness value for the coin. Each share is encrypted with the public key of each corresponding server in the multicast group SG. It is followed by the public V S of the Bank's signature to the coin's face V S_ pub({|v$|} Kr Bnk ) and the private V S n, t-shared to all members of SG. The V S-private shares will be encrypted with the public key of each corresponding server in the multicast group SG.
Each auction server S i in the multicast group SG will multicast the second message to the group. This message simply states the auction identification and the closing statement. After each auction server S i has received at least t atomic multicasts stating the bidding phase is closed, no more bids are accepted. The inclusion of this message in the protocol is controversial for having no security intent, but the authors argue that due to the implementation characteristics of atomic multicast, communication is authenticated within the multicast group.
Then, each auction server S i will multicast to SG the auction identification aid and his shares S(Y, v$, w$) X com- Fig. 2 Franklin-Reiter sealed-bid auction protocol posed of the concatenation of the bidder's identity, the face value of the coin and the freshness function of the coin. After the reception of t multicasts, a server can locally reconstruct each bid Y, v$, w$ and deterministically compute the winner.
With the winner locally determined, each auction server S i will reliably multicast (again to SG) message four, which is composed of aid and the result of the V S verification of his share for the winning bid for the bank's signature to the coin's face value v$. After the reception of t multicast messages, an auction server can locally decide whether the winning bid is valid.
Finally, each auction server S i sends a unicast message to B, the winning bidder. The message is composed of aid, the bidder's identity and the signature of the concatenation of these values by the auction server S i . A bidder can collect the item if he possesses t tokens signed by different servers.
Although the protocol takes care of checking the bank's signature on the coin, coin reconstruction and deposit is out of scope for the protocol. By using an offline digital cash scheme, the protocol provides a degree of anonymity against the detection of the spending by the Bank. The authors propose an anonymity scheme to protect the bidder's anonymity against the auction house.
Protocol specification
Below, we have the specification of the Franklin-Reiter Sealed-bid auction protocol. We would like to note that we did not follow the complete description of the protocol. We deliberately weakened all multicasts in the protocol to unreliable multicasts. The reasons why we did that are twofold: first, as said before, our theories can only account for unreliable and reliable multicast. Second, we wanted to demonstrate the impact on proof strategy in this work. So, as we were unable to specify atomic multicast, we decided to specify only the unreliable version that was what we needed to make our point. Our goal was to define proof strategy for secrecy, the most complex type of property proof in the inductive method, using our multicast specification framework.
The specification of the Franklin-Reiter sealed-bid auction protocol starts, as usual, with the inductive definition of a constant naming the specification called fr. It is a set of possible traces (lists of events), representing the formal protocol model. The Isabelle/HOL specification is shown in Definition 10. We define the empty trace by the rule Nil, which sets the base of the induction. The next two rules represent the possibility of fake messages being sent by the Spy. Although our initial specification took into account the reception of messages, it turned out not to be necessary for demonstrating our objectives in terms of proof strategy. Its addition only made proofs more complex with no direct impact on the strategy. The protocol provides little evidence to the bidder regarding the correct outcome of the auction. This is a clear violation of Bella's goal availability principle [4] . Although our proofs do not use the message reception framework, we model reception events above for the sake of completeness.
The first message of the bid casting phase is specified below. Some of its preconditions are merely technical.
Definition 11 Inductive definition of Franklin-Reiter Protocol : Bid Casting
|FR1:"[[ evs1∈fr; Nonce w / ∈ used evs1; w = close; w / ∈ sessionIDs; w / ∈ shares; aid ∈ sessionIDs; v = close; v / ∈ sessionIDs; v / ∈ shares; Nonce v / ∈ used evs1; Multicast S multicast_group (λC. {|Nonce aid, Number close| }) / ∈ set evs1 ]] ⇒ Multicast B multicast_group (λC.
{|Nonce aid, Crypt(pubK C)( {|Nonce(share(nat t, multicast_group, C) {|Agent B, Nonce v, Nonce w | }), Nonce aid| }), Nonce (pub_share (nat t, multicast_group, C) (signOnly (priSK Bank) (Nonce v))), Crypt(pubK C) (Nonce(priv_share(nat t, multicast_ group, C) (signOnly(priSK Bank)(Nonce v))))| }) (signOnly (priSK Bank) (Nonce v))), # Notes B {|Nonce aid, Nonce w, Nonce v | } # evs1 ∈ fr" Definition 11 starts with inductive rule FR1, stating that the trace evs1 belongs to the inductive set fr, the nonce w and the nonce v were not used in this trace before, are not equal to the constant close, does not belong to sessionIDs and does not belong to shares. We also require that the auction identifier aid belongs to sessionIDs and that FR2 (closing the auction) has not appeared in the trace. If these preconditions are met, we extend the trace of events evs1 belonging to fr with FR1.
Message one is a Multicast event from the bidder B to the multicast group of auction servers. Its payload has the nonce aid as the session identifier, followed by the bidder B's identity concatenated with the digital coin v and nonce w. The bidder's identity, coin description and coin function are shared to the multicast's destinations with a threshold t. Each share is encrypted with the intended destination's key creating the sharing token share (nat t, multicast_group, C) {|Agent B, Nonce v, Nonce w|}, which is encrypted. Then the coin's digital signature's public share is included using a verifiable secret sharing scheme to the same group and threshold parameters as the initial sharing scheme. The public part
pub_share (nat t, multicast_group, C)(signOnly (priSK Bank)(Nonce v))
is directly included in the message. The private share
priv_share (nat t, multicast_group, C)(signOnly (priSK Bank) (Nonce v))
is encrypted with the intended destination's key. Formally, a share is modelled as a nonce, because it is a large integer that is infeasible to guess.
To finish the FR1 specification, we formalise B's knowledge of his bid through a Notes event. This is needed because parts and used do not know about share. B's knowledge of the unique identifiers aid, w and v is necessary for some proofs.
Message two is specified as rule FR2 in our specification of the Franklin-Reiter protocol. The preconditions are that evs2 is a valid trace of events for the protocol, that aid belongs to the set of sessionIDs, the auction server S belongs to the multicast group and that we have a bid (an instance of FR1 in the trace). If these preconditions are met, we extend the trace evs2 with a multicast from the S to the multicast group containing aid and the command close as shown in Definition 12.
Definition 12 Inductive definition of Franklin-Reiter Protocol : Bid Closure |FR2:"[[evs2 ∈ fr; S ∈ set multicast_group; aid ∈ sessionIDs; Multicast B multicast_group (λC. {|Nonce aid, Crypt (pubK C) ( {|Nonce(share(nat t,multicast_group, C){| Agent B,Nonce v,Nonce w | }),Nonce aid| }), Nonce (pub_share (nat t, multicast_group, C) (signOnly (priSK Bank) (Nonce v))), Crypt (pubK C )( Nonce(priv_share(nat t,multicast_group,C) (signOnly(priSK Bank)(Nonce v))))| }) ∈ set evs2 ]] ⇒ Multicast S multicast_group (λC.
{|Nonce aid, Number close| }) # evs2 ∈ fr"
Again in FR2, we had to take some decisions regarding our specification. Similarly to FR1, we did not implement any trigger and assumed the multicast as being unreliable. But here the authors impose a very strong requirement, atomic multicast where multicasts from within the group are authenticated. Our concept of atomic multicast is weaker. We took this specification decision although it could allow attacks that the authors would reject on the basis of their assumptions.
Once no more bids can be cast in the auction and the servers agree that the auction is closed, we proceed to a phase where we verify which bidder cast the best bid. In the Franklin-Reiter protocol, this is done by message three, which is specified by our inductive rule FR3 as shown in Definition 13. The preconditions for rule FR3 are that the trace of events evs3 is part of our inductive specification for the protocol that the auction server S is not compromised, that the auction identifier aid is a session identification, that the triple (B, v, w) represents a valid bid for the auction aid in the events trace evs3 and that the auction was closed by the existence of FR2 in the trace. If these preconditions are met, we extend the trace evs3 with two events. A first event Notes to the auction server S the values for aid, v and w followed by a Multicast event from the auction server S to the multicast group running the auction service. The payload of this message is composed of aid, plus the share the server holds for the bid being broadcasted.
Definition 13
Once again, we have made some specification decisions. In rule FR3, we extend the trace by a Multicast event and then we extend it again with a Notes events. The latter is done for the sake of giving the servers following the protocol the knowledge regarding the values of the bids they opened.
Message four is represented in our specification by rule FR4, as shown on Definition 14. Its preconditions are that the trace of events evs4 is valid, that aid is in the set of sessionIDs, that the triple (B, v, w) is a valid bid within the auction aid in the trace evs4 and that the nonces w and v are in the knowledge of the auction server S. If these preconditions are met, we extend the trace of events evs4 by adding an event Notes to the auction server S for the bank's digital signature for the coin's face value. Then, we add a Multicast event from server S to the multicast group of servers running the auction containing aid and his share of the digital signature for the coin of the winning bid.
Definition 14
Inductive definition of Franklin-Reiter Protocol : Bid Collection |FR4: "[[ evs4 ∈ fr; S ∈ set multicast_group ; aid ∈ sessionIDs;(B, v, w):bids aid evs4; S / ∈ bad; Nonce w ∈ knows S evs4; Nonce v∈knows S evs4;]] ⇒ Notes S (signOnly (priSK Bank) (Nonce v)) # Multicast S multicast_group (λC. {| Nonce aid, Nonce ( priv_share (nat t, multicast_group, S) (signOnly(priSK Bank)(Nonce v)))| }) # evs4 ∈ fr"
As with FR3, we have a double extension of the trace: a multicast and a note that they were able to validate the coin. Here, we again simplified the original protocol. Instead of implementing the verifiable signature sharing proposed by the authors, we decided to implement a reconstruction using the casting of the private shares to the multicast group members.
This specification choice clearly weakened the protocol, since at this point one server can collude with the attacker and deposit the coin for himself. But our choice is justified beyond the plain simplification of the verification process, since the guarantees the original protocol yields are just that the coin may be reconstructable at a later time, and not that it is indeed reconstructable, since more than n − t server can be corrupted after the protocol run.
Our focus here is the demonstration of the suitability of the multicast theory, not of the full verification of the FranklinReiter protocol. We sought only to verify the secrecy of the bids before closure time. This was enough to validate the multicast events theory. For this modest objective, we can make with a simple version of rule FR4.
With the winning bid known and with its digital coin payable, we can now deliver to the winner the tokens he needs to collect the item. Message five is a unicast from each one of the servers that concluded the protocol execution to the winning bidder with the winner declaration token. We specify message five from the Franklin-Reiter protocol as our inductive rule FR5. It starts with the precondition that evs5 is a valid trace, that aid is in the set of sessionIDs, that the triple (B, v, w) is a valid bid within the auction aid and that the nonces w, v and the digital signature for the coin's face value (signOnly (priSK Bank) (Nonce v)) are known by the auction server, S. If these preconditions are met, the auction server sends the winning bidder a message consisting of aid, the winner's identifier B, and the same items signed using the server's private key. With the specification of message five, we complete the protocol description. Note that the specification of rule FR5 deliberately takes some steps to test our multicast specification and the distribution of knowledge within the protocol. First, the preconditions to the firing of FR5 are based on the knowledge of the auction server S acquired during the previous phases and the contents of the bid set. Second, we deliberately did not represent the unicast method using the Multicast event to be able to test the integration of our specification with the original one in the inductive method.
Here, we took similar specification decisions as we did in the previous messages. But note that the trigger required for collecting the item in this message is left off-protocol by the authors, which makes it difficult to verify the ability of collecting the item by the winner.
General validity proof
We stress that the proof we show here are not the complete set we verified. It is shown to exemplify the suitability of the multicast event theory in dealing with knowledge distribution and with mixed environments. We focused on verifying the secrecy as a way of showing that our multicast specification is capable of representing real problems.
We will be looking to Lemma 14 (bid_secrecy), which concerns the secrecy of v, the coin's face value. Concomitantly, we have two similar lemmas for w and {|v|} Kr Bank . This lemma states that if an event with syntax of the messages yielded by rule FR1 is in the trace of events, and the bidder B is not colluding with the Spy, and the Spy is not in the multicast group of auction servers, then coin's face value v is not in the knowledge of the Spy.
Lemma 14 bid_secrecy
{|Nonce aid, Crypt(pubK C)( {|Nonce(share(nat t,multicast_group,C) {|Agent B, Nonce v, Nonce w | }), Nonce aid| }), Nonce (pub_share (nat t, multicast_group, C) (signOnly (priSK Bank) (Nonce v))), Crypt(pubK C)(Nonce (priv_share(nat t,multicast_group,C) (signOnly (priSK Bank)(Nonce v))))| })) ∈ set evs); B / ∈ bad; Spy / ∈ set multicast_group; evs ∈ fr ]] ⇒ Nonce v / ∈ analz (knows Spy evs)
Proving Lemma 14 (bid_secrecy) is difficult, as is common for secrecy properties. We start by using the common proof method for secrecy lemmas. We are left with seven subgoals, representing the two Fake rules and the five protocol steps. The Fake rule can be proven appealing to the fact Fake_analz_eq, which states that X ∈ synth(analz H) ⇒ synth (analz (insert X H)) = synth (analz H). The subgoals regarding messages two to five are proven appealing to the fact that v / ∈ sessionIDs and to the function congruence rule to eliminate the λ expression in the multicast events. Proving the subgoal for FR1 involves applying the tactic auto augmented with the destruction rule for function congruence customary for multicast messages. The proof tactic auto carries out simplification and resolution steps in all remaining subgoals. This yields seven new subgoals. The first one is proven resorting to the fact that v / ∈ sessionIDs. Another two of these subgoals are proven appealing to analz_into_parts and shares_shares, which are simple facts. The next two subgoals are proven by appealing to Multicast_imp_in_parts_spies and the fact that if v is inside a share it belongs to the set used. The final two subgoals are proven appealing to analz_keyfree_into_Un which isolate key material in the analz set and the fact that v is not in sessionIDs.
General reinterpretation of security goals under multicast
Extending the inductive method to accommodate a multicast communication primitive requires a reinterpretation of how the method works and how some security goals should be understood. The first change is the modification of the idea of trace of events. Prior to the introduction of the Multicast primitive, we seen a linear trace and a linear expansion of the knows and used set. For each message, knows and used were only changed for a sending and receiving peer. Now one message cast can change potentially infinite sets of knows for the peers mentioned in the multicast message. Following the ideas outlined by Bella [4] and shown on Fig. 3 , a generic trace is a list of any length that is the parameter for the modelling and verification of protocols properties.
Interpreting the relation between trace expansion and the knows and used set expansions, we see the linearity in both. The knows set for peer A is initialised with the peer's a priori knowledge: his own shared key and private keys as well as all the public keys. After sending the first message into the trace, by the definition of knows, the knowledge of peer A will be extended by the message's payload. The same will happen for any Notes event. After the extensions proposed by Bella [4] , the knowledge set of a peer is also extended by a message reception event Gets. The recipient of a message from the network will insert its payload into his knowledge Fig. 3 Linear trace example from Bella [4] set. A similar procedure happens to the extension of the used set. To conclude, for every message event in the trace, we expect a linear expansion of the sets knows by the size of the payload of the Says event.
If we look closer at the relation occurring in a one-to-many communication style, we see that this linearity is lost. When we cast a multicast event in the trace we are not extending the knows and used sets by exactly the payload of the message, but by the application of the payload function over the list of agents in the multicast group. This inherently changes the shape of the trace construction as we do not have this conveying of knowledge between two peers only. The inductive method is capable of coping with this exponential growth in the size of the trace information, which clearly corroborates our choice in using it as the testbed for our verification efforts.
Another important reinterpretation concerns the goal of Secrecy, due to the leakage of information to peers by the usage of side-channels inherent to multicast. As mentioned earlier, with the exception of multicast being used in an anycast mode of operation, we can argue that there is a sidechannel leaking information that could be formalised within the method. Although the method is not prepared to make use of this information today, expanding it to encompass newer threat models may be important to representing knowledge that could help us to protect or prepare better retaliation attacks.
Final remarks
We have extended the inductive method to enable it to reason about non-unicast message-casting frameworks. Based on the assumption that other message-casting methods are special cases for multicast, we built a theory for representing multicast communication. The point of building such a theory was to create a more flexible infrastructure for the inductive method to represent new classes of protocols. We have also experimented with our proposed design to show its backwards compatibility and its novel verification capabilities.
Our experiments have shown that specification of new message-casting frameworks is feasible and that it can specify a whole new set of verification quests. Our initial idea that multicast is the basic building block for specifying any message casting is corroborated by the experiments we did with our specification. We now set the foundation to enable a whole new set of protocols not based on unicast. A promising prospect of our enhancement of the method is the possibility of verifying voting protocols based on broadcast.
We expect to see more demand for protocol verification methods capable of being extended; capable of representing the interesting subtleties of ever new designs. Extensibility becomes a key issue to this field because of the stability it has already assumed. No major theoretical breakthrough has happened in the last decade. The community must work to broaden the scope of verification methods to cover an ever growing set of security protocol types.
A finding that intrigued us is the one of side-channel leakage. Although we decided not to pursue it in this manuscript due to the extensiveness in changing the actual Dolev-Yao threat model, we would like to note it is something worth investigating. It makes for a good future work in this field.
On the aspects of our direct contributions to protocol verification, we envisage the verification of election protocols using the inductive method as being the next big step. With the set-up for supporting multicast, anycast and broadcast, it is possible for a whole new family of such protocols to be verified by the Inductive Method. This will include the investigation of new security goals such as anonymity, which such voting protocols require. Verifying anonymity will definitely require a new change of the data type events to support anonymous transmission.
